Abstract This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.
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Introduction
This paper provides an overview of recent studies on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We do not attempt, however, to survey this rapidly growing field in its entirety but rather concentrate on its political economy. We provide an overview of the current theoretical modelling approaches and an overview of empirical investigations into the political processes that drive the formation of IEAs and their design. Our survey covers what falls into the intersection of environmental economic analyses of IEAs on the one hand and the literature that has emerged in the domain of public choice on the other hand. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey of this field of literature, although the relevance of considering political processes in the analysis of IEAs has been recognised before (see for instance Finus 2008) . Efficient environmental mitigation policies for transboundary pollutants require international coordination and cooperation because of international externalities (e.g. Ostrom 1990 ). Whereas we can usually assume that governments can design and enforce environmental policies at the national level, there is no supranational body that can take the role of a government at the international level. Property rights, that is, emission rights for transboundary pollutants and resources, are usually not well-defined, let alone enforced. The role of IEAs is to define property rights and to overcome an environmental anarchy (Buchanan 1975; Weikard 2011) . In much of the remainder, for ease of presentation of ideas, we will focus on the case of climate policies where greenhouse gas mitigation is a global public good. But (international) environmental agreements deal with many different issues like pollution and resource use and may refer to local, regional or global scales. Thus, the relevance of our survey is not limited to climate change.
Different studies analyse directly the negotiation process and the outcome related to IEA formation (e.g. Young 1994; Miles et al. 2002; Barrett 2003; Mitchell 2009 ). Economic analyses of environmental policies offer important recommendations for the design of efficient and effective environmental policies. But frequently the models used as tools for analysis conceive governments as benevolent social planners whose goal is to increase the welfare of their citizens. Public choice scholars, however, have challenged this assumption as being too restrictive (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2000; Oates and Portney 2001; Mueller 2003) .
Our view is that political economy complements environmental economics with an analysis of the political process. Thus, political economy considers a government's actions not as mainly driven by welfare maximising objectives but rather assumes that political agents are susceptible to being influenced by other agents, for instance through a desire of the government to increase its prestige, to enhance its possibilities of being re-elected or to increase its budget (Schumpeter 1942; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Niskanen 1987; Persson and Tabellini 2000) . Therefore, governments are considered to be influenced by voters and lobby groups where the media may play an important role. Political economy models can be interpreted as extensions of conventional economic models of collective decision-making. For our purpose, we adopt a broad definition as proposed by Oates and Portney (2003) who define ''political economy'' as: the study of the collective or political processes through which public economic decisions are made (Oates and Portney 2003, p. 327) .
For the case of IEAs, this definition suggests an analysis of the goals and constraints of governments at the international negotiation tables (Persson and Tabellini 2000; Mueller 2003) . The position of governments is usually influenced by domestic political negotiations leading to results that differ from the welfare maximising policy, even from the perspective of an individual country. International negotiations are shaped by governments who interact with other political agents such as political pressure groups (lobbies) and the electorate or by intragovernmental processes such as competition between ministries. These aspects are important for the design of IEAs as international policies are confronted with different feasibility constraints at the national level.
Modelling political processes may help to explain why policy recommendations aiming at efficiency differ frequently from what is actually implemented. Furthermore, it may help to anticipate the acceptability of policy proposals, and it may contribute to improvements in constitutional designs in order to mitigate inefficiencies. Many studies of the political economy of environmental policy-making are devoted to national environmental policies; early contributions are Buchanan and Tullock (1975) and Becker (1983) . However, only few studies have explored the political economy of the formation of IEAs. For instance, Michaelowa and Greiner (1996) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) , Michaelowa (1998) , Congleton (2001) , Vogt (2002) and Böhringer and Vogt (2004) focus on political processes within a country. The studies by Haffoudhi (2005a, b) , Buchholz et al. (2005) , Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2007) and Roelfsma (2007) explore political economy approaches to IEA design and stability.
We divide our survey into three main parts: (1) theoretical approaches to the political economy of IEA formation (Sect. 2), (2) empirical studies including experiments (Sect. 3) and (3) implications for future research (Sect. 4).
Theoretical model approaches
With few exceptions, the literature on IEA formation considers monolithic governments that represent the interests of their nation in international negotiations (e.g. Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1997; Caparrós et al. 2004) . Even though this approach has yielded many important insights, it ignores the fact that governments often have interests not in line with those of their domestic constituents. Moreover, it does not consider that the incentives embodied in elections and other political control systems may ultimately determine what these governments can and will decide at the international negotiation tables. Political scientists and public choice scholars have long advocated these ideas. In a representative democracy, national political actors influence policy decisions of their representatives-including positions taken in international negotiations. Barrett (1998) distinguishes five different stages of international environmental treatymaking. These are (1) pre-negotiations, (2) negotiations, (3) ratification, (4) implementation and (5) renegotiations. The first stage defines the rules for the negotiation and ratification which are the core of the process. Clearly, a ratified treaty needs implementation at the national level. Finally, the option to renegotiate is always relevant.
Ideally a political economy model of IEA formation has to cover the particularities of all five stages since decision-making at any stage must take into account decisions at earlier and later stages. However, complexities of the political process do not allow for a fully comprehensive analysis. So far, the environmental economic literature on IEA formation has focused largely on stages 3 and 4 using game theoretical approaches. The analysis of implementation, stage 4, although of major importance for the ultimate success of an IEA, suffers from oversimplification. This stage is crucial for the effectiveness of a treaty as industries and consumers must finally change their behaviour. Most models, however, adopt the assumption that countries simply stick to the agreement and compliance issues are not addressed; but see McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) for an exception. Similarly, renegotiation options are not frequently considered. Renegotiations are particularly important when uncertainties unravel over time and expected pay-offs of agents change as more information becomes available. Generally, the very option to renegotiate can change behaviour and therefore treaty design at previous stages. Obviously, modelling renegotiations increases the number of strategic options for each agent, and the analysis is hampered by structural and computational complexities. While there is some game theoretical analysis of renegotiations of IEAs (de Zeeuw 2008; Weikard et al. 2010 ), we are not aware of any work that combines renegotiations with an analysis of the political process. Therefore, we confine the remainder of this section to stages 1-4. First, as mentioned before, note that stages are not independent of each other and that the conventional game theoretical approaches usually cover more than one stage. Most common are analyses of stages 3 and 4, focussing on the incentives of countries to sign and ratify an IEA. Few studies offer a joint analysis of more than two stages. For example, Carraro et al. (2009) cover stages 1, 3 and 4; Caparrós et al. (2004) cover stages 2, 3 and 4; and Weikard et al. (2010) cover stages 3, 4 and 5. Also note that most model approaches do not distinguish between signing an agreement (the outcome of negotiations) and ratifying it. Thus, stages 2 and 3 are often not clearly distinguished.
Pre-negotiations
Pre-negotiations (stage 1) define rules for negotiations and ratification. The first relevant aspect is who is represented at the bargaining table. The usual assumption in environmental economic model analyses is that the parties negotiating are nation states. In the domain of IEAs, and different from, for example, trade agreements, there are usually no participation restrictions. Each country that wants to join an IEA can join (open membership). Finus et al. (2005) examine the implications of membership rules for IEA stability and find that open membership may hamper the establishment of stable agreements since ''unattractive'' coalition partners are allowed to join which makes signing up for the agreement not worthwhile for other potential members.
A second important issue at the pre-negotiation stage are the rules and conditions that determine when a treaty becomes binding. These minimum participation rules (MPRs) are very common for IEAs. In environmental economic analysis of IEAs, minimum participation is usually defined as a minimum number of countries that need to ratify an agreement before it becomes legally binding. There are only a few studies focusing on MPRs. The standard approach analyses MPRs assuming homogenous countries and complete information (e.g. Rutz 2001; Rubio and Casino 2005; Courtois and Haeringer 2005; Carraro et al. 2009 ). The result is a stable grand coalition (participation of all countries). Weikard et al. (2009) study the impact of an MPR for the case of heterogeneous countries, and, following Carraro et al. (2009) , they consider an endogenous choice of the MPR. They find that an MPR will always be implemented. The efficient outcome requires participation of all countries. However, countries with sufficient bargaining power will be able to maintain a free-rider position, and the grand coalition will not emerge. Considering uncertainty about the benefits of environmental protection-certainly relevant for case of climate change- Black et al. (1993) explain that it may be suboptimal to require participation of all countries. The reason is that countries will have different expectations about what can be gained from an agreement. While in Black et al. (1993) the MPR is given exogenously, Harstad (2006) endogenises the MPR decision. The MPR is identified by majority voting. As the voting game may not have a Condorcet winner, however, a stable equilibrium MPR may not evolve endogenously.
Negotiation and ratification
We now turn to stages 2 and 3, negotiation and ratification. These are closely linked as national governments can only agree on those treaties that are likely to be ratified at national levels. At the ratification stage, national governments have to deal with multiple interests (Putnam 1988 ). There are two constraints: First, a government's proposal at international negotiations should be acceptable to its domestic constituents because this, in the end, will help to win elections (Morrow 1991) . Second, political pressure groups (or lobbies), such as business associations and environmental NGOs, are capable of affecting the behaviour of politicians by providing information, by financing election campaigns or by bringing environmental concerns into the voters' minds (Grossman and Helpman 2001) . These political factors play an important role when the national representatives meet at the international level to negotiate mitigation levels and policies, for instance. In the remainder of this section, we explore both types of policy-making.
Strategic delegation
One way of extending (environmental) economic models in order to include elements of the political process is the use of median voter models.
1 The underlying assumption of these models is that the majority winning political proposal coincides with the median voter's preferences (Black 1948; Downs 1957) . The median voter theorem is applied in many political economy models but builds on rather restrictive assumptions like a onedimensional policy space and unimodal preferences. Still the median voter theorem may be useful to understand the potential impact of voters' strategic behaviour on a country's position in international negotiations. In a strategic delegation model of IEA formation, voters delegate their decision power to representatives at the international negotiation tables. The representatives, usually the government, then negotiate the terms and conditions of an international agreement. A general result of these models is that, under strategic voting, voters prefer to delegate the power to a representative who has different preferences from her own. This implies that the Condorcet winner of the voting game represents the median of the stated, not of the true preferences. Then, one may conjecture that strategic voting would exacerbate the free-rider incentives in the transboundary pollution game. However, the impact of strategic delegation on IEA formation has not been fully explored yet, and the results obtained so far are ambiguous. Depending on the assumptions and model design, elected politicians can either represent stronger or weaker environmental preferences than the median voter's. The strategic delegation model generally used to analyse international policy-making is a two-stage game. At the first stage, voters (using majority rule) elect their preferred politician who, at the second stage, will negotiate the international treaty. In the usual twocountry symmetrical setting, voters take the result of the foreign election as given and then select the candidate that represents the most favourable position in the subsequent policy game. In this setting, voters may elect a politician with different preferences than their own; the outcome usually deviates from the median voter's true preferences. In essence, the median voter strategically misrepresents her own preferences because this gives an advantage at the international policy negotiations (see Persson and Tabellini 2000, Chapter 12 ). The strategic delegation approach has mainly been applied to international tax and monetary policies but also to IEAs for the provision of transboundary public goods. (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 1992; Dolado et al. 1994; Segendorff 1998; Buchholz et al. 2005; Roelfsma 2007 ).
In the domain of international tax and monetary policies, voters may find it profitable to elect more ''conservative'' governments compared with their own political preferences. For tax policy, it would be optimal to elect a government that is less sensitive to the prospects of the tax policy when capital becomes more mobile because this offsets the economic consequences of higher capital mobility on the tax rate (Persson and Tabellini 1992) . For monetary policy, governments delegate the control to independent more conservative central bankers (with respect to the chosen output/inflation ratio) than their own preferences as a means to commit to a more restrictive monetary policy (Dolado et al. 1994) .
In the domain of IEA formation for the provision of transboundary public goods (e.g. avoided damages from climate change), the effects of strategic voting are ambiguous. When voters elect citizens that have different preferences than their own, the elected representatives may or may not have weaker preferences for the public good than the median voter. The outcome of strategic voting depends on whether or not countries act cooperatively under a given IEA. Countries that cooperate negotiate the terms of the IEA and decide jointly on the provision of a public good such as greenhouse gas abatement. Countries that act non-cooperatively do not join the IEA and determine their public good contribution individually as a best response to the decisions of the other countries.
The findings are, first, that when countries do not cooperate, the results are not necessarily gloomy. A ''race to the bottom'' with governments less green than the median voter is not inevitable. If the provision of the public good can be achieved through taxation (for instance by a pollution tax in both countries), it can be shown that when the median voter has sufficiently ''green'' preferences, both countries engage in a ''race to the top'' and elect governments that care more for the environment than the median voter (Roelfsma 2007; Kempf and Rossignol 2010) . The median voter would anticipate a lenient policy abroad if her own country increases its taxes, thus by strategic delegation of the tax policy to a greener politician she could commit to higher environmental taxes shifting the polluting activities abroad. With symmetric countries, the foreign median voter adopts a similar reasoning and both countries end up with politicians that are greener than the median voter. However, if the median voters' preferences for the environment are sufficiently weak, then the standard result of strategic delegation models prevails and both countries end up with governments less green than their median voters (Buchholz et al. 2005; Roelfsma 2007) .
Second, when countries cooperate, it exacerbates not only the pessimistic result from the strategic voting framework but also the free-rider incentives of countries negotiating the IEA (Segendorff 1998; Buchholz et al. 2005) . The model used to analyse this case is a three-stage game. At the first stage, citizens elect politicians, that is, median voters in each country elect their preferred governments. At the second stage, elected governments negotiate over the level of economic activity and transfers-for instance adopting the Nash bargaining solution. If an agreement is reached, it becomes binding. Otherwise, at the third stage, countries adopt a non-cooperative policy, that is, a Nash equilibrium that constitutes the threat point for the bargaining stage. In the equilibrium, the median voter in each country chooses a government that cares less about the environmental problem than she does, because this improves the strategic position of the government at the bargaining stage. Moreover, if countries sign an agreement, voters will elect governments that are even less environmentally concerned, that is, less green than the governments elected when countries are non-signatories. Hence, strategic voting undermines the success of IEAs in tackling the environmental problem and the outcome does not reflect the median voters' true preferences for environmental quality.
Lobby groups
In his seminal contribution on ''The Logic of Collective Action' ' Olson (1965) offers an extensive description of lobbying activities. In a representative democracy, political decision-making is not solely influenced by the concerns of the general electorate. Government decisions may be influenced by lobbies' pressure and political outcomes may differ from the median voters' preferences even if voters vote ''truthfully''. Olson notes that interest groups are confronted with free-rider problems. This limits the capability to organise common interests-which is essential to influence decision-making. However, if interest groups are able to overcome this problem (e.g. by offering excludable services to members), then they can influence political decisions. Political economy studies dealing with lobby groups in policy-making may be classified into two categories depending on the motives of lobby groups: the electoral motive approach and the influence motive approach Helpman 1994, 1996) . The first argues that lobbies wish to promote the candidate that reflects their preferences on a policy issue before upcoming elections. The second argues that lobbies aim to influence the policy choice of an incumbent politician.
According to the influence motive approach, an incumbent government maximises its political support function by implementing a certain policy. The political support function usually includes contributions by lobbies and social welfare. The analysis abstracts from details of the electoral process, but contributions can be thought of as a means to influence voters. Thus, contributions do not need to be monetary but may also relate to, for instance, media pressure. Grossman and Helpman (1994 ) assume that competing lobby groups offer contributions to a government. The contributions are conditional on the policy implemented and aim at avoiding the costs related to environmental regulations in the case of industry lobbies. Environmental lobbies would contribute in order to induce higher environmental standards (Hillman and Ursprung 1994) . In the international domain, governments would take a particular position in IEA negotiations in return for contributions. This will usually result in policies that deviate from the welfare maximising policies as well as from the median voters' preferred policy.
The political contributions approach has been further developed in the domain of environmental policy-making. Results from this literature are indicative for the strong influence that lobbying activities have on diverse subjects such as the determination of environmental tax policies (Fredriksson 1997) , the internalisation of externalities (Aidt 1998 ) and the determination of trade and environmental policies in the presence of transboundary pollution problems (Conconi 2003) .
Although there is a large literature on lobby groups and international policy-making, the analysis of the potential effects of lobbying on the formation and stability of IEAs has not been examined in detail-with the exception of Haffoudhi (2005a, b) and AltamiranoCabrera et al. (2007) . Their approaches use the canonical model of IEA formation introduced by Hoel (1992) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) where countries first decide whether or not to join an IEA and then set their emission levels such that IEA members act jointly and maximise joint pay-offs while the remaining singletons maximise their individual pay-offs. The approaches differ in the use of some crucial assumptions, namely homogeneity of countries and the distribution of lobby contributions. If countries are homogeneous and if there is joint maximisation of the political revenues of all signatory countries, a global agreement would be sustained by means of lobby contributions from industry (Haffoudhi 2005a, b) . Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2007) relax these assumptions. In a model with heterogeneous countries where governments do not benefit from foreign lobby contributions, they find that signatory governments will usually accept contributions from the environmentalist lobby. In this setting, global cooperation is unstable and only partial coalitions emerge.
Implementation
At the implementation stage, national governments have to pass environmental legislation and guarantee enforcement in order to fulfil what has been agreed at the international level. The general assumption that implementation follows without further consideration is too restrictive in many cases.
Different factors influence the implementation of IEAs (Dietz et al. 2003) . Their success differs between democracies and autocracies as well as between different democratic systems (e.g. parliamentary democracies vs. presidential democracies); cf. Sect. 3. Within democracies, Frey (1992) , Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003) , and Kollmann and Schneider (2010) distinguish four different types of agents that are relevant for the process of policy-making: (1) voters, (2) politicians, (3) public bureaucrats and (4) agents related to industries (e.g. capital owners, managers and employees). How IEAs are implemented at the national level is, again, subject to strategic voting and lobby activities. Command and control policies are a regular response to environmental problems while economic theory suggests the superiority of market-based policy instruments. The discrepancy between recommended and actual policies can be understood when preferences of the different interest groups are considered. First, politicians may face less opposition when they implement inefficient command and control measures instead of market-based instruments (Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003; Kollmann and Schneider 2010) . In a recent study, Urpelainen (2012) explains that green politicians who implement renewable energy standards (as an instrument to cut carbon emissions) would gain support from the renewables sector even if the industry is dispersed. The industry mobilises green voters in order to increase the size of future markets and profits. While the established groups that support fossil fuels must cooperate for effective lobby activities, the renewables sector does not have to coordinate political action.
A relevant driver of implementation is the ''dirty work hypothesis'' (Vaubel 1986, p. 48) . It says that it is difficult for governments to make unpopular and costly policy decisions. In order to adopt costly environmental policies, for example, it might help governments to blame binding contracts for such unpopular decisions. The ''dirty work hypothesis'' has been applied to explain delegation of power to higher levels of decisionmaking, for example in case of the International Monetary Fund (e.g. Dreher 2009) or central bank independence (e.g. Freytag 2007 ). The ''dirty work hypothesis'' has implications for IEA formation as well. When facing international environmental problems, governments have an incentive to distribute the costs that would accrue to particular interest groups to the general public, that is, the tax payers. If, in addition, information costs (about the policy measure) increase with a higher degree of centralisation, knowledge gets more and more exclusive to organised interest groups. The loss in transparency allows politicians to support particular interests without facing an adequate opposition by less organised voters. This may explain (at least partly) the increasing role of the European Union in international environmental negotiations, reducing the influence of the individual nation states.
International environmental cooperation: empirical and experimental studies
In what follows, we provide a brief overview of empirical findings about international environmental policy coordination and cooperation. The survey of empirical work in this domain is complemented by a summary of recent experimental studies that explore the behavioural responses to problems of institutional choice.
Determinants of IEA formation
In order to identify what drives individual countries' incentives to reduce emissions and to sign an IEA, several studies examine the impacts of democracy. There is support for the hypothesis that democracy has a positive impact on signing IEAs. An early contribution is by Congleton (1992) who shows that total emissions are larger under democracy. However, the emission of methane per unit of economic output is significantly less compared to nondemocratic regimes. Results obtained by as well as support the view that more political freedom is positively correlated with emission reduction when countries with similar levels of development are compared. Neumayer (2002a) finds evidence that democracies are participating more frequently in IEAs. Fredriksson et al. (2005) study the effect of environmentalist lobby groups and the degree of democracy on environmental policy-making. Their analysis for OECD countries shows an effect of lobby activities on policy-making. However, this effect is more likely to occur in countries with sufficiently high levels of political competition. Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2007) are able to establish that the generally positive correlation between environmental performance and democracy is mainly due to the use of parliamentary systems. By contrast, in many cases, presidential congressional systems perform similar to autocracies. Fredriksson and Wollscheid relate this result to the fact that parliamentary democracies have a lower degree of separation of powers on the one hand and a higher degree of legislative cohesion on the other hand.
Beside democracy, there are additional determinants of the success of IEAs. Gleditsch and Sverdrup (2002) use bivariate regressions and find that the ratification of IEAs as well as the presence of environmental organisations within a country positively affects national environmental policy-making. There is a positive correlation between trade openness and signing an IEA (Neumayer 2002b) . Roberts et al. (2004) look at different parameters influencing IEA participation. Their empirical results identify three important variables with a significant positive impact: first, the narrowness of the export base; second, voice and accountability of citizens through their domestic institutions; and third, the role of NGOs.
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A phenomenon related to the influence of lobbying is the existence of corruption since interest groups find it easier to shape political decisions in favour of their own interests under corrupt governments ). An important strand of empirical literature is devoted to the analysis of the impact of corruption on the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the results from this body of literature are ambiguous. While some studies support the hypothesis of corruption as a ''grabbing hand'' that increases costs of multinational firms and so deters FDI (e.g. Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Egger and Winner 2006) , other studies support the hypothesis of the ''helping hand'' meaning that corruption can foster FDI as it helps to overcome regulations and administrative hurdles (Alesina and Weder 2002; Egger and Winner 2005) .
The link between these studies and the influence of lobbying is that many environmental and industry organisations receive funding from foreign entities. For instance, examine the impact of environmental lobbying on signing the Kyoto Protocol. Environmental lobbying is measured by the number of organised environmentalists within a country. They find a positive correlation between environment-related interest groups and the probability that countries sign an IEA. A second finding is a positive correlation of IEA membership and corruption. This rather surprising finding is mainly due to the particular incentives of developing countries to sign an IEA. It suggests that monetary transfers to environmental interest groups in developing countries (e.g. by international organisations) are more effective in influencing the ratification decision under corrupt regimes where interest groups can more easily shape political decisions in favour of their own interests.
A more general analysis of the drivers of IEA ratification is offered by Perrin and Bernauer (2010) . They use a multivariate econometric model based on likelihood estimation. The model allows treating separately endogenous and exogenous factors influencing a country's ratification decision. They find that exogenous factors like country size, geographical adjacency between countries, and foreign countries' level of gross domestic product (GDP) positively affect the decision to ratify an IEA. A negative correlation is found when foreign countries are seen as competitors. Regarding the endogenous (country specific) factors a positive effect is reported for trade openness and a negative effect for pollution share and population size. No significant result is reported for the national per capita GDP. The stringency of policies for the Kyoto agreement is studied by von Stein (2008) . Her results suggest that flexible mechanisms can facilitate treaty implementation. The study further supports the hypothesis that NGOs are important for successful implementation of IEAs. Almer and Winkler (2010) also look at the Kyoto protocol and find that countries that expect high damages from climate change are more likely to sign and ratify an IEA, whereas a negative correlation is found for countries with high compliance costs. Another interesting question refers to the preferences and motives of climate policymakers. Freytag and Wangler (2008) find a link between free-riding on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and export expectations. As climate change is a long-lasting problem, non-cooperative behaviour might be overcome in the longer run. Thus, early investment in abatement technologies will generate positive export expectations in cooperative countries. For the German case, Freytag and Wangler (2008) find evidence that export expectations for green technologies (proxied by patent counts) are positively correlated with the diffusion of green technologies at the national level. This might explain partly the observed heterogeneity among industrialised countries with respect to the stringency of climate change policies.
Environmental policy-makers' preferences for equity are studied by Lange et al. (2007) . Their findings suggest that equity plays a more important role for representatives of developing countries. Thus, policy-makers from developing countries support the view that environmental regulation should be dependent on the level of development implying higher abatement levels for more developed countries. They also find a difference with respect to the preferences concerning environmental regulation of industries as representatives from richer countries disapprove more often the allocation of the costs to the polluter. Interestingly, representatives of developed countries who are in office for a long time are more in favour of allocating pollution permits according to population shares of countries. Thus, it seems that representatives of developed countries become more concerned about equity over time while and if they remain in office. However, the overall results suggest that the regional differences of the equity concerns depend on the level of development.
Experimental literature on cooperation and IEA formation
In recent years, experimental research methods have been applied to improve the understanding of environmental problems (Sturm and Weimann 2006; Milinski et al. 2008) . A criticism of the experimental approach is that the external validity of results from the laboratory is difficult to establish. However, experiments are helpful to study strategic interaction among agents and possibilities for cooperation. As these issues are essential for environmental policy-making, experiments help to better understand problems that are essential for IEA formation. Therefore, experiments complement the game theoretical models as well as the empirical findings.
A few experiments have been designed in order to provide insights in strategic interaction related to IEA formation. Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003) study the role of leadership in a so-called ''public bad'' experiment. In this experiment, two investment options are given. One consists of an investment generating negative externalities to group members and the other consists of an investment without externalities. The pay-off structure is chosen such that it is a dominant strategy under selfish behaviour to invest the entire endowment into the choice option with externalities. Compared to a treatment without leadership, contributions to the public bad (in the leader-follower setting) are less if leaders start their investment with a positive investment signal (this means that they contribute to the investment without externalities). However, the gains that are related to the leading position (lower externality costs) are not enough to compensate leaders for their costs of deviating from their dominant strategy. An important role of leadership is also reported by Sturm and Weimann (2008) . They test whether a leader can induce additional abatement of followers. The experiment shows that the leader mostly chooses an abatement near to social optimum. Leadership matters compared to a situation without leadership. However, it is not able to increase the profit of the leader and to overcome the social dilemma situation. In most of the cases, the leader fails to induce cooperation, meaning that only a few followers react cooperatively. Strategic interaction at the ratification stage is part of an analysis by McEvoy (2010) . He finds, different from the theoretical predictions, that free-riders (at the coalition formation stage) are not the first who opt out of the coalition. Most players wait and decide at the end of a pre-defined time period not to become a coalition member. McEvoy et al. (2011) look at the compliance and enforcement problem to contribute to a public good. They do not find support for their main hypothesis that member-financed enforcement to maintain compliance within a stable coalition results in greater participation and higher public good provision. Dannenberg et al. (2010b) study unilateral preferences on equity. They ran an online experiment with subjects who had been involved in climate change negotiations. The underlying game was set up in order to test equity preferences based on Fehr and Schmidt The political economy of international environmental agreements 397 (1999) . One of the findings is that subjects have a significant aversion against advantageous inequality (one dislikes being relatively better off than others), whereas the aversion against disadvantageous inequality (one dislikes being relatively worse off than others) is only moderate. In contrast to other empirical findings (e.g. Lange et al. 2007 ), Dannenberg et al. (2010b) do not find significant regional differences in equity aversion. One explanation for the difference of the empirical findings and the experimental results might be that national interests (a country's position at the IEA formation stage) outweigh individual equity concerns. Cherry and Dickinson (2008) examine the role of choice options to contribute to a public good. They find that voluntary contributions to the public good increase if there are more options available. This suggests that IEAs need to offer different ways to contribute to the public good. Freytag et al. (2010) report results of a threshold public goods game over six rounds with exogenous milestones and punishment. Milestones are meant to represent international policies, for example international environmental agreements. They find that milestones have a significant effect in those cases where the public good implies the conservation of a status quo, such as, for instance, a given level of environmental quality.
Recent experimental work of Dannenberg et al. (2010a) and McGinty et al. (2012) directly targets individual group formation behaviour for the provision of a public good. Both studies are motivated by games of IEA formation. In the experiments, participants were playing two-stage games where they announce their willingness to join a coalition at the first stage and play a public goods game at the second stage. In the study of Dannenberg et al. (2010a) , agents have identical pay-off functions. In the control treatment, no coalition could be formed. Comparing coalition formation to the control treatment, small and insignificant increases in the overall provision of the public good were observed. McGinty et al. (2012) consider experiments where pay-offs differ across agents. They introduce this heterogeneity in order to test the impact of different transfer schemes among coalition members. They find that a well-designed transfer scheme that distributes the coalition payoff proportionally to outside options enhances membership and average contributions significantly.
Knowledge gaps and implications for research
This survey serves to identify some gaps in the study of the political economy of IEA formation. These gaps define needs for future research. Generally, as it is obvious from a comparison of Sects. 2 and 3, the basic theoretical framework for the study of IEAs is largely unrelated to the empirical approaches. This observation does not extend, however, to experimental studies. The reasons are probably threefold. (1) The standard two-stage game of IEA formation offers a ''traditional'' view with countries as players but no room for political processes. Extensions of this model are possible but very rare so far. (2) Empirical studies offer interesting findings but little insight into the mechanisms that drive policy outcomes. (3) Finally, it is notoriously difficult to test ''a theory of international environmental agreements''-even if it existed-due to a lack of data that are comparable across different kinds of agreements.
We wish to highlight four areas for promising research. First, for the case of strategic voting, there is a need to build convincing voting models that better reflect the ''real'' aspects of the political process. For instance, most models consider simultaneous voting in different countries that precedes international policy-making, and the analysis is restricted to just two countries. Games that offer a convincing sequential structure are yet to be developed.
Second, ratification of IEAs could be modelled as sequential games where at each moment each parliament/government may decide whether to ratify or to wait. Such a model set-up would allow for a role of lobby groups after the negotiations when the main commitments are already drafted. The ultimate ''fate'' of the IEA is, thus, subject to a different type of pressure given the particular decision-making process of a parliament or congress and the way in which lobby groups can influence it.
Third, on the empirical side, a better match of concepts and data will be one way forward. For instance, some empirical analyses of lobbying rely on data describing corruption (see, for instance, . Although in some cases there may be a positive relation between corruption and lobbying, this cannot be generalised because, as in the analysis of the impact of corruption on the influx of foreign direct investment, the results at this stage are ambiguous. After all, while corruption is illegal, most lobbying activities are legal. For European countries, for instance, that are generally characterised by low levels of corruption but powerful lobbies, a corruption indicator will fail as an appropriate indicator of pressure on governments at the international negotiation tables.
Finally, political relevance suggests further research into the role of institutions for the stability and success of IEAs (e.g. MPRs, definition of emission and resource rights, allocation mechanisms etc.). Furthermore, technological and structural change towards more environmentally friendly production processes impact and are impacted by IEAs (Nagashima and Dellink 2008; Nagashima et al. 2011) . Hence, the political economy of industrial policies is also linked to IEA formation. In Sect. 3.1, we report that transition towards democracy and trade openness has been found to be important. This shows that the analysis of IEAs may also be addressed from a comparative systems point of view.
